Christopher L. Carter

PhD candidate in political science
University of California, Berkeley

Christopher L. Carter. Did early education expansion reinforce interethnic inequality? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Latin America.

   Abstract How did the earliest phase of education expansion shape interethnic inequality in Latin America? This paper argues that in delegating responsibility for education to majority white and mestizo municipal councils, central governments in Latin America functionally assured interethnic inequality in education access. Yet, the manner in which this inequality was created varied depending on the ethnic composition of municipalities. Particularly determinative was the way education was financed. In heterogeneous municipalities, local government officials extracted wealth from indigenous communities to provide education selectively to their non-indigenous coethnics. In homogeneous indigenous municipalities, education provision was very low, as the non-indigenous governing elite had no incentive to expand schooling beyond their small coethnic minority. And in homogeneous non-indigenous municipalities education provision was likewise low, except when intra-elite competition encouraged the non-indigenous political elite to incur the cost of taxing their coethnics. I test this argument using descriptive data, a natural experiment from nineteenth-century Peru, and case studies from Peru and Mexico.

Christopher L. Carter. Communal Landholding and the Coordination of Ethnic Voting: Evidence from Mexico and Peru.

   Abstract Public goods are often allocated along ethnic lines in heterogeneous societies. However, variation exists in the extent to which one ethnic group controls resources as opposed to another. In this paper, I use the cases of Peru and Mexico to explore the conditions under which indigenous citizens elect coethnic leaders and how the election of such candidates affects the distribution of public goods provided across ethnic groups. I argue that where communal landholding institutions, which tend to have a mostly indigenous membership, have persisted, differences in development outcomes between indigenous and non-indigenous populations are greatly reduced. Such a reduction is largely due to the the fact that communities solve coordination problems, allowing indigenous voters to support a single indigenous candidate, who, when victorious, rewards communities with public goods. Using data from a conjoint experiment, lab-in-the-field, and a natural experiment, I provide evidence to show that 1) a candidate‚Äôs community membership is an important determinant of whether she receives the support of community members; 2) that trust in the candidate is a key mechanism in explaining this preference; and 3) that mayors who are community members reward communities with more public goods than mayors who are not from communities. Funded by: US Department of Education, UC Berkeley Institute for International Studies John L. Simpson Memorial Grant, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Mexus, National Science Foundation
Implementing partner: IPA

© 2018 Christopher Carter
Adapted from road2stat (Nan Xiao)